This paper examines consumer bankruptcy filing rates. It attempts to identify some trends and some economic indicators that might predict those filing rates. While several studies examined these questions prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), there remains considerable uncertainty and debate over what economic factors correlate to consumer bankruptcy. This is the first study that takes into account the impact of BAPCPA, both in anticipation of and in the aftermath of its effective date.
1. Part I lays out the historical filing rate data following the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Part II examines the impact of BAPCPA on filing rates, and finds that the dramatic post-BAPCPA drop in filings may be almost over. Soon, consumer bankruptcy filing rates are likely to return to their pre-BAPCPA levels. Part III then analyzes the possible correlation of numerous plausible economic data sets to non-business bankruptcy filing rates. The paper finds several such data sets that correlate to non-business filings to a high level of statistical significance. These economic indicators point to a return to pre-BAPCPA filing levels. However, those indicators also suggest that it is unlikely that consumer filings will increase much over those old levels unless fundamental underlying economic changes occur. The findings in Part III further indicate that if Congress wants to curb consumer bankruptcy filings, it needs to focus on treating root causes -such as the explosion in revolving consumer credit -rather than on symptoms. Thus, BAPCPA may have been misguided This paper examines consumer bankruptcy filing rates. It attempts to identify some trends and some economic indicators that might predict those filing rates. While several studies examined these questions prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), there remains considerable uncertainty and debate over what economic factors correlate to consumer bankruptcy. This is the first study that takes into account the impact of BAPCPA, both in anticipation of and in the aftermath of its effective date.
1. Part I lays out the historical filing rate data following the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. Part II examines the impact of BAPCPA on filing rates, and finds that the dramatic post-BAPCPA drop in filings may be almost over. Soon, consumer bankruptcy filing rates are likely to return to their pre-BAPCPA levels. Part III then analyzes the possible correlation of numerous plausible economic data sets to non-business bankruptcy filing rates. The paper finds several such data sets that correlate to non-business filings to a high level of statistical significance. These economic indicators point to a return to pre-BAPCPA filing levels. However, those indicators also suggest that it is unlikely that consumer filings will increase much over those old levels unless fundamental underlying economic changes occur. The findings in Part III further indicate that if Congress wants to curb consumer bankruptcy filings, it needs to focus on treating root causes -such as the explosion in revolving consumer credit -rather than on symptoms. Thus, BAPCPA may have been misguided Introduction This paper looks at consumer bankruptcy filing rates, and attempts to identify some trends and some economic indicators that might predict those filing rates. The $64,000 question (which, adjusted for inflation, today would be the "$484,537 question") is, what causes consumer bankruptcy? Answering that question with any degree of confidence probably is impossible (or might win me the Nobel Prize for Economics if I were able to answer it). Here one must be wary of the causation-correlation trap. What we can do to skirt that trap is to consider the question of what economic indicators are correlated to, and thus may be able to predict, consumer bankruptcy filings.
Much rhetoric has been bandied about over the past quarter century about the consumer bankruptcy crisis, and a tough new bankruptcy bill was passed in 2005 largely on the basis of unproven assumptions and guesses about why that crisis came to pass, and how it might be fixed. This paper seeks to provide some hard data to replace the guesswork. While several studies examined these questions prior to the passage of the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA), there remains considerable uncertainty and debate over what economic factors correlate to consumer bankruptcy. This is the first study that takes into account the impact of BAPCPA, both in anticipation of and in the aftermath of its effective date.
Part I lays out the historical filing rate data following the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, which began the modern era of "high" consumer bankruptcy filing rates. Part II examines the impact of BAPCPA on filing rates, and finds that the dramatic post-BAPCPA drop in filings may be almost over. Soon, consumer bankruptcy filing rates may return to their pre-BAPCPA levels. Part III then analyzes the possible correlation of numerous plausible economic data sets to non-business bankruptcy filing rates, and finds several such data sets that correlate to non-business filings to a high level of statistical significance. The findings in Part III suggest strongly that if Congress wants to curb consumer bankruptcy filings, it needs to focus on treating root causes -such as the explosion in revolving consumer credit -rather than on symptomatic reactions, and thus BAPCPA may have been misguided.
I. Filing Rates
It is common knowledge that bankruptcy filing rates rose dramatically in the quarter century following the effective date of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. On the eve of the October 17, 2005 effective date of BAPCPA, non-business bankruptcy filings spiked up sharply. However, in the immediate aftermath of the effective date of BAPCPA, bankruptcy filing rates fell drastically. These filing trends are shown by Chart 1. If one normalizes for population growth, the filing rate chart look very similar, as illustrated by Chart 2. However, the picture of non-business bankruptcy filings is much less dramatic when only the past decade is used, as seen in Chart 3.
Chart 3
As Table 1 shows, 1997 was the beginning of the "modern" era of consistently high nonbusiness bankruptcy filings. That was the first year of more than a million non-business bankruptcy filings, with 1,263,006 such filings, up over 25% from the prior year's previous high of 989,172. 1997 also was the first year that non-business filings surpassed 4.0 per 1,000 population, reaching 4.717 per 1,000.
Since 1997, however, while non-business filings still have grown, they have done so at a much, much more modest pace. Where total non-business filings more than quadrupled from 1985 to 1997 (from under 300,000 to 1.26 million), they increased a total of only 15% from 1997 to 2006 (from 1.26 million to 1.45 million). Even more telling, the increase in filings per 1,000 population has increased only three percent total from 1997 to 2006, from 4.717 to 4.872 -a minuscule annual growth rate in per capita filings of barely three-tenths of one percent. By contrast, from 1985 to 1997 the filing rate per 1,000 went from 1.252 to 4.717. In the past decade, total non-business filings have ranged from a low of 1,240,012 (in 2000) to a high of 1,613,097 (in 2003) , and in the year ending June 30, 2006, fell . Non-business filings averaged 386,464 for those 17 quarters, and with remarkably little deviation from the mean. In the three reporting quarters that included the time period after BAPCPA was enacted and before it became effective, by contrast, filings averaged 548,585 -a 42% jump over the average of the prior 17 quarters. And the spike is really even much more dramatic, since the figures for the three "spike" quarters are dampened considerably by the inclusion of about four months of time either pre-enactment (March 1-April 19) or post-effective date (October 17-December 31), the latter period when filings plummeted.
In the two full quarters following BAPCPA's effective date, non-business filings have totaled 263,660, a per-quarter average of just 131,830 -barely a third of the pre-BAPCPA enactment average of 386,464. However, when all of the "aberrant" quarters (those following BAPCPA's enactment and preceding and following the effective date of BAPCPA) are averaged, we see an "average" quarter of 381,883 filings -almost identical to (98.8%) the prior 17-quarter average of 386,464 -but of course with a much higher standard deviation. This data suggests the possibility that the post-BAPCPA plummet in filings may have just about played out -unless fundamental changes have occurred. As Part III. will show, that does not appear to be the case.
Further evidence of the possibility that the crazy spike/drop in quarterly filings may be nearing the end of its run can be seen by considering the moving average of non-business filings. Table 2 .
Chart 5
H o w does the picture look when non-business filings are broken down by chapter (7 and 13)? As Chart 6 below and Table 2 demonstrate, in examining the quarterly non-business bankruptcy filings in chapter 7 and chapter 13, it is evident that both the pre-BAPCPA-effective-date spike and the post-BAPCPA fall-off in filings were much more drastic in chapter 7 than in chapter 13. This of course is hardly surprising, since the reality -and the perception -was that BAPCPA was making it much more difficult for consumer debtors to obtain chapter 7 relief. Little wonder, then, that anyone who was considering filing chapter 7 would rush to the courthouse to file before BAPCPA supposedly brought down the curtain of ready chapter 7 access. For over four years, from the start of 2001 through the first quarter of 2005 (i.e., just before BAPCPA was enacted on April 20, 2005), chapter 7 filings were remarkably constant, averaging 275,297 per quarter, with a very modest deviation. In the three reporting-period quarters in which consumer debtors had a chance to file post-BAPCPA enactment and pre-effective date, by comparison, chapter 7 filings averaged 446,503 -62% higher than the previous 17 quarters. It is little wonder, then, that the total chapter 7 non-business filings for the two quarters following the BAPCPA effective date were 154,924, or an average of 77,462 per quarter -just 28% of the one-quarter average of 275,297 for the 17 quarters preceding BAPCPA's enactment. If the deviant five pre-and post-BAPCPA quarters are averaged, however, we see a quarterly average of 298,886 -slightly higher than the preceding 275,297 average, but only by 8.5%. While the consideration above of all non-business filings indicated that the run of belowaverage filings might be largely over, this data on chapter 7 filings suggests the possibility that chapter 7 filings might remain slightly below historic (viz.., pre-BAPCPA enactment) levels for another quarter -again, unless some fundamental change has occurred.
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In looking more closely at chapter 13 filing trends, the first fact of note is that (unlike chapter 7 filings, which spiked) there was virtually no change at all in chapter 13 non-business filings in the time period respectively, an average of 54,242 -almost exactly half of the 110,937 quarterly average for the pre-BAPCPA world. The drop, however, in chapter 13 filings has been much less than in chapter 7, where the post-BAPCPA drop, to date, has been to barely a quarter of historic levels. If the five quarters beginning with BAPCPA's enactment are examined, we see an average quarterly chapter 13 filing rate of 82,809, approximately three-fourths of the prior average of 110,937.
Looking at this data, one can speculate about some possible explanations for the recent trends in the chapter 13 filing rate. As noted above, the dramatic jump in chapter 7 is explainable largely by consumer debtors trying to take advantage of the old, more favorable law. So, too, it is likely that a substantial number of putative chapter 13 filers (i.e., those who absent the enactment of BAPCPA might have filed chapter 13 some time from the fourth quarter of 2005 on) moved up their Chapter 7 non-business filings Chapter 13 non-business filings bankruptcy filings to beat BAPCPA's effective date. While most of the press has gone to the "tough new chapter 7," so too did BAPCPA make chapter 13 harsher for consumer debtors (especially those above the state median income). This "race to the courthouse" idea for chapter 13 would help explain the substantial decline in the post-BAPCPA chapter 13 filing rate (down to half of prior levels), but does not explain why the pre-BAPCPA effective date rate did not correlatively increase, as was true in chapter 7. Rather, the total for the last five quarters in the chapter 13 rate is down about 25% from prior levels (from 110,937 per quarter to 82,809). Thus, chapter 13 filings the last five quarters are off by 28,128 per quarter.
Where did those chapter 13 filers go? To chapter 7, apparently -where for the last five quarters non-business filings are up 23,589 per quarter. Overall, recall that average non-business filings for the last five quarters (since BAPCPA was enacted) are down by only 4,581 per quarter, which is just 1.2%. However, there has been a shift in the composition of the filings, as between chapters 7 and 13. Actually, there have been two distinct distributional shifts, in radically opposite directions. Before BAPCPA was enacted, the chapter 7/13 split was approximately 71%-29%, as seen on the next page in Chart 7. Overall, in the five quarters since the enactment of BAPCPA the split has moved to 78%-22%, as seen in Chart 8. That is, since BAPCPA was enacted, total nonbusiness filings are almost exactly the same as before, but there has been some substitution effect of chapter 7 filings for chapter 13 filings. But that statement, standing alone, may be misleading, since it fails to highlight two distinct time periods. In time period number one, which is comprised of the three quarters that include the post-enactment, pre-effective date world (that is, the last three quarters of 2005), the chapter 7/13 split was 81%-19% (reflecting quarterly averages of 446,503 and 101,854, respectively), as seen in Chart 9. Thus, the chapter 7 percentage went up significantly. By contrast, Chart 10 shows that in the two complete quarters since the BAPCPA effective date (the first two quarters of 2006), non-business chapter 7 filings totaled 154,924, while there were 108,484 chapter 13 non-business filings, a chapter 7/13 split of just 59%-41%. Thus, in this second time p e r i o d , t h e percentag e o f chapter 7 filings has g o n e d o w n substantia lly. While Congress probably would be delighted if chapter 13 filings continued at over 40% of non-business filings, as reflected by Chart 10, one may wonder whether such will continue to be the case. Remember from Chart 8 that only 22% of all non-business filings have been under chapter 13 since President Bush signed BAPCPA into law on April 20, 2005, a percentage which is actually below the 29% that existed before enactment, as seen in Chart 7. Taken fairly, these statistics probably reflect little more than the far greater rate of filing acceleration from the post-BAPCPA to the pre-BAPCPA effective date in chapter 7 as compared to chapter 13 cases. In addition, it seems plausible that a small percentage of prospective chapter 13 filers chose instead to file chapter 7 prior to October 17, 2005, while the prior more generous chapter 7 option was available. Where the chapter 7/chapter 13 ratio will go in the future is difficult to predict. By the end of 2006, or perhaps more accurately by the end of the first quarter of 2007, we should have a better sense of that trend, since by then it is likely that virtually all of the "accelerated" pre-BAPCPA filers will have been accounted for.
Chart 7
Before moving to a consideration of economic indicators as compared to the bankruptcy filing rate, let us recap some findings from the data on bankruptcy filing statistics:
bankruptcy filing rates have grown dramatically since the Bankruptcy Code went into effect, with total non-business filings increasing six-fold from 1980 to 2006, and filings per 1,000 people increasing almost five-fold in that time;
2) most of that increase occurred from 1985 to 1997, when filings quadrupled; since 1997, by comparison, filings are up only 15% total, and are up just over three percent when adjusted for population growth;
3) overall non-business bankruptcy filings went up dramatically in anticipation of BAPCPA's effective date, especially in chapter 7, AND 4) overall non-business filings are down substantially since BAPCPA's effective date, BUT, taking these two points together, we see that 5) the total filings since BAPCPA was enacted are virtually identical to prior filing rates, which were remarkably stable, which suggests that soon bankruptcy filings soon may revert to historic levels; 6) chapter 7 non-business filings had a higher "beta" than chapter 13 filings; that is, they went up more prior to BAPCPA's effective date and went down more afterwards than was the case for chapter 13 filings; indeed, chapter 13 filings did not change on the eve of BAPCPA; and 7) the ratio of chapter 7 to chapter 13 filings has shifted substantially in light of BAPCPA, with a pre-effective date increase in the chapter 7 ratio; a post-effective date decline in the chapter 7 percentage, and a slight increase in the chapter 7 percentage since the enactment of BAPCPA.
III. Bankruptcy Filing Trends and Economic Indicators
This part of the paper will examine the correlation of the following economic indicators to the non-business bankruptcy filing rate (per 1,000 population). I have chosen various sets of Credit card charge-off rates are published by the Federal Reserve (starting with 1985) and can be found at http://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/chargeoff/default.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2006 Table 7 (Appendix) contains the statistical data for these ten independent variables, with the non-business bankruptcy filing rate as the dependent variable. In addition, one-year and two-year time lags from the independent to the dependent variable are calculated for several of the categories -total consumer credit, revolving consumer credit, home mortgage debt, and total debt. Testing at a 95% confidence level, statistically significant correlations to the non-business bankruptcy filing rate were found for every independent variable except for credit card delinquencies. Correlation coefficients of greater than 90% were found for six of the independent variables -total consumer credit, revolving consumer credit, revolving credit as a percentage of total credit, home mortgage debt, total debt, and the ratio of total debt to personal income. Revolving consumer credit showed a correlation coefficient of .974. It is important to bear in mind that this data shows only that these economic data sets likely are correlated to non-business bankruptcy filings; it does not mean that these factors cause consumer bankruptcy. Table 3 (Appendix) sets out the data for consumer credit (total, revolving, and nonrevolving), which is shown visually in Charts 11-16. Recall from Table 7 discussed above that each of these three independent variables correlates with statistical significance to the non-business bankruptcy filing rate. For total consumer credit, the correlation is especially close when a two-year time lag (Chart 12) is used. This is partially consistent with the findings of Professor Robert Lawless in a forthcoming paper, The Paradox of Consumer Credit. Professor Lawless, examining filing rates from 1933 to 2004, found that "[i]n the long run, increasing consumer credit leads to increased bankruptcy filings."
8 However, he also found that in the short term, increased consumer credit actually led to a decrease in bankruptcy filings (thus the "paradox"). This paper did not find a similar negative short-term correlation for the period from 1980-2006., but instead found that increased total consumer credit correlated with increased non-business bankruptcy filings with no time lag, a one-year time lag, and a two-year time lag. 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 H o w does the picture look when the two components of total consumer credit (revolving and nonrevolving credit) are considered separately and compared to the non-business bankruptcy filing rate? Consider revolving credit (typically credit card debt) first.
Chart 13
Chart 13 reveals an extremely close relationship between the amount of revolving consumer credit and the non-business bankruptcy filing rate for the past quarter century. Table 7 indicates that this visual picture is not misleading: revolving consumer credit has a correlation coefficient with 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000 2,500,000 3,000,000 3,500,000 4,000,000 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 1,000,000 1,500,000 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 non-business bankruptcy filings of over 97%, and correlates with a P value of less than 0.01. If a time lag (two years) between the revolving credit and the non-business filings is used, a similar very close relationship exists. Chart 14 presents that data.
Chart 14
Given that revolving credit is principally credit card debt, Charts 13 and 14 indicate that the enormous increase in credit card debt in the past quarter century may have helped trigger the correlative jump in, and closely predicts the rate of, non-business bankruptcy filings. This conclusion suggests that changing the bankruptcy law to make it harder for consumer debtors -as Congress did in 2005 -may be a fools' errand. If revolving credit continues to grow, or even to remain stable, then this data suggests that non-business bankruptcy filings are likely to follow in like measure (unless BAPCPA can somehow change history). The post-BAPCPA drop in filings is likely to end, and soon, given the amount of outstanding revolving consumer credit. Thus, if Congress really wants to slow or even reverse the increase in bankruptcy filings, the real target should be the underlying cause -credit card debt -and not the bankruptcy law itself.
If one believes that the close relationship between revolving consumer credit and nonbusiness bankruptcy filings is likely to persist, the logical question then would be, what will happen to the amount of revolving credit in the future? Looking at Table 3 and Charts 13 and 14, we can see that the amount of revolving consumer credit has remained fairly constant since 1999, after more than quadrupling from 1983 to 1998. Each year since 2002, revolving credit has gone down by very slight amounts. We may be approaching a market saturation point; by this time, there may be few untapped candidates for revolving consumer credit out in the marketplace. At the very least, it seems unlikely that we ever again will see the sort of explosion in revolving credit that occurred from 1983 to 1998 -and correlatively, also unlikely that we ever again will see the sort of exponential increase in consumer bankruptcy filings that occurred during that same time period. Recall that the rate of non-business filings has hardly changed at all in the past decade -in 1997, it was 4.717 per 1,000 population, and in the year ending June 2006, it was 4.872 per 1,000. Bottom line: bankruptcy filings will return to close to pre-BAPCPA levels, and soon, but will probably stay in that range for some years to come. 1,000,000
1,500,000 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 How do the data for non-revolving credit correlate with non-business bankruptcy filings? According to Chart 15 and Table 7 : they correlate, but not as well. The correlation coefficient is only 72%, but the correlation is statistically significant. Chart 15 suggests that the mapping of nonrevolving credit and non-business bankruptcy filings has been closer since 2001 than it was before..
Chart 15
Given that revolving credit is such a good indicator of filing rates, and nonrevolving credit less so, I examine whether an even better indicator would be the percentage of revolving credit of the total amount of consumer credit. As Chart 16 and Table 7 show, this percentage is correlated with statistical significance with non-business bankruptcy filings, but not quite as closely as the total amount of revolving credit. So, the better measure remains total revolving credit.
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Nonrevolving 1,000,000 1,500,000 2,000,000
2,500,000 1 9 8 0 1 9 8 2 1 9 8 4 1 9 8 6 1 9 8 8 1 9 9 0 1 9 9 2 1 9 9 4 1 9 9 6 1 9 9 8 2 0 0 0 
Chart 20
Some have posited that non-business bankruptcy filings might be correlated with the "debt to income" ratio. Intuitively, this idea makes sense -as the percentage of a debtor's income that must be devoted to debt service increases, that debtor is more likely to encounter financial distress. Table 5 contains data for the percentage of total consumer credit as compared to personal income and for the same comparison using instead the total of consumer plus mortgage debt. A statistical study of filing rates from 1947 through 1990 found that "the debt to income ratio is significant and positive." 10 Table 7 shows that both of the debt to income independent variables considered in this paper -total consumer credit alone, and total consumer credit plus home mortgage debt -are positively correlated with statistical significance to the non-business bankruptcy filing rate. The correlation coefficient for the sum of total consumer credit and home mortgage debt is slightly higher than for total consumer credit alone (about 90%, versus 84%). The data is presented visually in Charts 21 and 22, on the next page. 10,000,000
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Chart 22
The next data sets to consider concern credit cards. The data are the rate of credit card charge-offs and the rate of credit card delinquencies. This data is published by the Federal Reserve. The data begins in 1985 for charge-off rates and in 1991 for delinquencies. It is published on a quarterly basis. I have selected the second quarter data, thus allowing consideration of the most recent 2006 data. The data is found in Table 6 and is presented visually in Charts 23-26. An earlier
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Conclusion
This paper has examined in detail the filing data and trends for non-business bankruptcies in the United States, and also has analyzed numerous sets of economic data looking for correlations with the non-business bankruptcy filing rate. Several conclusions may be drawn from this data. First, the huge decline in non-business bankruptcy filings following the effective date of BAPCPA is likely about to end. Filing rates probably will soon return to the range of pre-BAPCPA levels. However, those filing rates are likely to remain fairly stable over the next few years, as the amount of outstanding revolving consumer credit -historically an excellent predictor of consumer filing rates -appears to have leveled off. Having said that, two bits of data point in opposite directions: the recent increases in the amount of home mortgage debt may portend possible increases in nonbusiness bankruptcy filings, but the dramatic drop in credit card chargeoff rates points the other way.
The data indicate that BAPCPA was based on a canard. It does not appear that consumers have made a quantum shift to chapter 13 from chapter 7, as Congress had hoped would happen under BAPCPA. More importantly, the data suggest that BAPCPA was predicated on (to be generous) a false hope, that making the law "tougher" would discourage consumer debtors from filing bankruptcy. The evidence shows that debtors file bankruptcy in very predictable numbers, depending not on what the bankruptcy law provides, but on how burdened they are with debt. This should not have been surprising. If Congress wants to drive down bankruptcy filings, it needs to take steps to drive down consumer debt burdens. Otherwise, bankruptcy filings will remain high. We can only hope that a decade from now lawmakers do not repeat the BAPCPA mistake when they see that it did not deliver the results intended. 
